Germans in England - Ian D. Colvin |
If we inquire into the policy of the three Edwards, we shall find the same influences at work as we have seen from the Conquest. The kings want money; the Germans want trading rights; the two come together, and the deal is made. Thus, for example, in November 1280, Edward I is forming a great army for the invasion of Wales, and sending his agents not only through all England, but into the neighboring countries, to buy munitions of war. Is it a mere coincidence that on the 17th of that month he confirms the merchants of Germany in all their privileges, and promises that "he will not himself do anything nor permit others to do anything to infringe them"? The union of the British Isles under one crown is a great cause, but it needs money: the customs are even pledged for loans to the foreigner, Italian or German. In 1307 the King is unable to pay his debts to the merchants of Brabant, and he allows them to pay themselves from what is due to them from the Nova Custuma. And so we might find the explanation of the famous Carta Mercatoria of 1303.
We see the process even more clearly in the reign of that glorious prince, Edward III. In the year 1335 he is paying the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria a subsidy of 300,000 florins; the Electors of Cologne, Palatine, and Brandenburg are his pensionaries; to the Duke of Brabant he pays 60,000 pounds sterling— all to help him against the King of France. And in the same year, at York, he passes an Act protecting
". . . merchant-strangers" against the "grievous damages" done to them by "some people of his cities, burghs, ports of the sea, and other places," who refuse to allow these merchant-strangers to sell their" wines and other things . . . to any others but to themselves." It is therefore enacted "that all merchant-strangers, as well as denizens, may freely buy and sell corn, wine, flesh, fish, and all other provisions; wools, cloth, and all other vendible wares from whence-soever they come, as well in cities, burghs, towns, ports, fairs, and markets, having franchises, as in all other places." The only reservation which the "judicious prince" allows himself to make in this free trade charter to the foreigner is "that no merchant-stranger shall carry any wines out of this realm." As for the franchises and exclusive charters of the English cities, "they are herein declared to be of no force."
Truly a judicious prince. And when we look at his exploits in war we cannot sufficiently admire him. In 1359 he transports 100,000 men to Calais in no less than 1100 ships. What if his grudging Commons complain that he has destroyed English shipping by keeping all his merchantmen mobilised for six months? His victories are immortal in English history; his defeats are immortal in the histories of France. But glory has its seamy side. The Palace of Fame is fair to see; but the broker's man is generally to be found somewhere in the back premises—the obscure but real occupier. All those German princes and the German ships in which the invading armies are conveyed cost money. Edward III pawns his jewels, he pawns his crown, his second-best crown, his Queen's crown, his Queen, his infant son, and two of his earls.
In 1339 he pawns his crowns to Cologne and Trier, and borrows 54,000 florins from three burghers of Mechlin. He enters into a close alliance with the cities of Brabant, and spends a regal Christmas at Antwerp. When he proposes to depart, his creditors remind him that his debts amount to £30,000. He therefore leaves his Queen, his child, and the Earls of Derby and Salisbury as pledges against his return. A little later Cologne threatens to foreclose on the crowns, as the time in the bond has elapsed. On 14th February 1342 Edward writes to the Council of Cologne begging for an extension, and promising early payment through a Flemish money-lender with the strangely familiar name of Montefiore. In the meantime (1338) he has granted to Cologne confirmation of all their trading privileges in England.
Another of his accommodating friends is the Hanseatic, Tidemann von Lymbergh. To him and to John von Wolde he pawns, on 14th February 1343, half of the duty of 40s. per sack of wool which the merchants had agreed to pay to the King. In 1344 he pawns the great royal crown with two German merchants called Clippink, and two others called Ativolde. About Easter, 1346, he gives Tidemann his second crown, which the said Tidemann keeps for three years and returns on 17th February 1349. On 18th April 1346 Tidemann von Lymbergh, the four Clyppingen, Johan von Bek, and Tidemann Spisenhagel receive on behalf of the German Guild a special copy of the Hanseatic privileges, probably because for the moment there was nothing left to pawn. In 1347 the King pledges with Lymbergh several golden jugs and cups and gemencrusted ornaments. On August 25th of the same year he confirms an agreement between Lymbergh and the Black Prince, by which the tin mines of Cornwall are pledged to the German for three years. In 1348 the King sets up this mediaeval Rothschild as a landed proprietor, with manors on a thousand years' lease in Somerset, Wilts, Southampton, Bucks, Northampton, Cambridge, Suffolk, and Normandy. A little later the invaluable Tidemann is again renting the wool-tax (suhsidium lanarium) from the King. And we may be certain that where Tidemann had his finger, it was not merely Tidemann, but the other German merchants of the Hanse behind him.
It will not, perhaps, surprise my English readers if I say that at this time feeling is running high against the Germans. It is aggravated when English merchants are turned out of Flanders. The Hanse is blamed for the eviction, and the King has to bow before the anti-German storm. On 30th July 1351 he issues an order confiscating German goods in England. It sounds like a policy of thorough, but does not bear inspection. The goods of Tidemann and Oliver von Reule are declared to be exempt. And a little later we find further evidence of the King's real attitude. On 15th November a writ is issued to the sheriffs,
"notifying that the King had taken under his protection Hildebrand Sudermann, who had been charged with procuring the death of Richard Curteys, a Bristol merchant, . . . and of insulting the English nation; and commanding proclamation to be made against inflicting any injury upon the said Hildebrand or other merchants of the Hanse of Almaine." And a little later the situation is entirely cleared up. On 20th August 1352 the King issues a writ to the sheriffs "to make proclamation to the effect that, notwithstanding a recent order of the King for the arrest of merchants of the Hansfe of Almaine and their goods, the said merchants were to be allowed free intercourse with England, with the exception of Hildebrand Sudermann."
In other words, Sudermann has been banished as a scapegoat, the storm has blown over a little, and the King thinks it safe to revoke his temporising order.
Nor was Tidemann von Lymbergh the only German to rise to greatness in the reign of this judicious prince. A certain Hanseatic called James or Jacob Doseyn provided ships and munitions for the siege of Calais, and found so much favor in the eyes of the King that popular rumor in England made him the source of all the privileges of the Easterlings. Then there was the redoubtable John, the Iron Count of Holstein, whose doughty deeds gained for him the thanks, and probably something more substantial than the thanks, of a grateful monarch.
Altogether Edward's reign was a glorious but expensive example of Freeman's policy of the "natural alliance." With all his victories this judicious prince ended by losing everything in France save Calais. In spite of all his gifts and charters, the Emperor and the subsidised German princes failed him in his hour of need. He reduced France to a coinage of leather; but he himself died in a poverty no less desperate, leaving a kingdom without a navy, with an oversea trade almost monopolised by the Hanseatic League. Yet there are several things which reconcile us to this judicious prince. He encouraged the cloth industry in England, if for no better reason than to force Flanders into an alliance against France. And when he went to Coblentz to beg the Emperor to allow the princes (whom he had already paid) to fight against France, he yet refused to kiss the Imperial toe.