Kissinger - Gary Allen

Betraying Freedom in Latin America

The Nixon campaign rhetoric in 1968 promised a hard line against Communist excursions in the Western Hemisphere. But as in so many cases in the Nixon Era, while the conservatives got the rhetoric, the Liberals got all of the action. When Rockefeller agent Henry Kissinger was installed as adviser on national affairs, it became apparent that "holding firm" meant giving the Communists almost everything they wanted, just as quickly as public opinion would allow.

The Rockefeller-Kissinger team immediately began promoting a Latin American foreign policy which was the very antithesis of the policy Americans thought they were getting when they elected Richard Nixon. It consisted of two main reversals of earlier promises. The first was a growing recognition of the Communist conquest of Cuba. Accepting this fact was to be sold to the American people as hemispherically inevitable, necessary for peace, and besides, it made good business sense.

The second key part of the Kissinger policy was even more ticklish, and it ran into stiff opposition from the start. That was Henry the K's repeated efforts to surrender U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal. The giveaway of this strategic waterway was being sold to the public as vital to improve our poor relations with much of Latin America.

But most Americans were too mesmerized by the three-ring foreign-policy circus overseas—the "opening" to Red China, the "peace" in Vietnam, the incessant war in the Middle East—to pay too much attention to what was going on in nearby Latin America.

soon after Nixon took office in 1969, conservative columnist Paul Scott reported that although "the President pledged to tighten the U.S. economic-political quarantine of Cuba if elected, Kissinger is working quietly within the Nixon Administration for just the opposite". It became known that Kissinger had asked the Rand Corporation to make a study on the feasibility of restoring political, economic, and cultural relations with Cuba.

In fact, Henry the K had even asked the Rand Corporation to study the circumstances under which the anti-Communist government of Brazil might be overthrown!

This second study was not triggered by a great Kissinger concern over Brazil shifting to the Left. It seems that some Brazilian government officials had discussed the possibility of expropriating the holdings of International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Rockefellers' Standard Oil of New Jersey.

While all this was going on, any efforts within the Nixon Administration to move against Communism in this hemisphere—and there were anti-Communists around Nixon as well as within the State and the CIA—were blocked by Kissinger.

The stage was set for U.S. trade with the Cuban tyranny and eventual U.S. recognition through one of Henry's usual tactics—secret U.S. maneuvering. The plan called for the Organization of American States to soften its stand against Cuba. Then the United States would reluctantly bow to "the will of the Americas" and grant recognition to the Castro regime. The whole affair was about as spontaneous as the Rose Parade.

The North American Newspaper Alliance reported in October 1974 that an agreement "in principle" for U.S. recognition of Cuba had already been reached and that:

"The current script calls for the United States to appear as if it were forced to acquiesce to the views of the other American States". NANA's Ernest Cuneo added: "In clinging to the ridiculous fiction that his State Department officials know nothing of the negotiations, Kissinger is moralizing to the American people—again.

By May 1975 The Review of the News could report that:

"Through the covert efforts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger governments of Latin American countries are being told that the U.S. looks with favor on the lifting of sanctions against Communist Cuba by the Organization of American States".

By June, Fidel Castro was so confident that the United States would restore diplomatic relations with Cuba that he predicted in Madrid's Arriba magazine, that recognition would occur, that Latin American countries would grow stronger while the United States grew weaker, and that Cuba was not planning to budge one inch on its declared aim of seizing our Guantanamo Naval base.

"Some day they will leave Guantanamo just as they left Vietnam in the war that cost them $150 billion!", the bearded one gloated.

Another part of Kissinger's propaganda effort on behalf of Castro was granting permission for "friendly" U.S. congressmen to junket to Cuba. The most enraptured visitor was former presidential candidate George McGovern, the muddled Leftist who made Richard Nixon look so good by comparison in 1972. McGovern's trip to Cuba resulted in a saccharin outpouring of eulogies for Castro and demands for an end to our economic embargo.

Kissinger, who arranged McGovern's private flight to Cuba from a U.S. airbase in Florida, got exactly what he wanted.

So in August 1975, the Organization of American States, meeting in Costa Rica, voted 16 to 3 with two abstentions to lift its sanctions against the Communist dictatorship ninety miles from our shores.

The U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Rockefeller man William S. Maillard, did not make even a token resistance to this carefully staged repudiation of Washington's policy for the past eleven years.

Incredibly, the vote whitewashing Cuba did not set any conditions or make any demands of the Red dictatorship. The United States delegates did not even mention the 2,000 Americans still confined on the island, the $2 billion indebtedness to Americans for property confiscated by Cuban authorities, the thousands of political prisoners languishing in Cuban dungeons, the 33,000 Cubans slain by the Communists to establish a Soviet power base on the island. All this was to be forgiven, forgotten, and ignored.

While Kissinger is cuddling up to Cuba, the island has become virtually a Russian military outpost. There are at least 25,000 Russian soldiers operating military bases at Mariel, Nipe, Cienfuegos, Cayo Largo, Playa Giron, and the Isle of Pines. Some 8,000 Russian technicians run most of Cuba's vital industries. There are frequent Soviet spy flights and reconnaissance sailings from points within Cuba.

For the past seventeen years, Communist Cuba has also been exporting its revolution in every way that it can. Airplane hijackings, for example, increased some four-hundred percent in the late 1960s—just after a school for hijackers was organized on the island. The evidence is indisputable that Havana has become a key base for the smuggling of opium and other hard narcotics from Communist supply sources in the Far East into the United States and Latin America.

Fidel Castro has openly gloated, of course, that he expects to take over the U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo—the multi-billion-dollar American outpost which is a vital link for American defense forces in the Western Hemisphere. Should Henry Kissinger present this giftwrapped to the Communists (and in Washington there are rumors such a secret deal has already been made), the Communists would threaten all shipping through the Panama Canal.

While Fidel's effort to supply the leadership to Communist revolts in other Latin and South American countries may have faltered in recent years, the presence of Cuban troops in Africa more than makes up for any failures closer to home. Any conceivable detente with Cuba became even harder to swallow in late 1975 and 1976 as it became clear that the Soviet Union was using Cuba as its major base for the armed takeover of Angola, the former Portuguese territory on Africa's west coast.

The 15,000 Cuban troops inside Angola may well have made the difference for the Soviet victory in the war there.

According to Paul Scott, thousands of Cuban troops, military advisers, and espionage agents, financed and directed by the Russians, are deployed in at least fifteen countries on three continents. In the meantime, Cuba's 150,000 man army remains the largest in the Western Hemisphere, other than our own.

As the Angola involvement developed day by day in late 1973 and early 1976, Kissinger sounded good. He talked tough about the Cubans sending soldiers to Africa, about the Soviet Union being in Africa, about the "extra-continental intervention" into Angolan affairs.

But as expected, the Administration did nothing to thwart the Communists. In fact, since much of the $81 million in the U.S. grants, loans, and credits for neighboring Zaire, run by the Marxist "President for Life" Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, were funneled into Angola, it meant the United States was in the unique position of helping Red China fund one of the "anti-Soviet" factions in the weird Angola war.

So while Kissinger publicly warned Castro about Cuban intervention in Angola, at the same time Henry K told the U.S. representative to the Organization of American States to vote for dismantling the OAS special commission which had kept tabs on Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere. Kissinger was about as sincere as W.C. Fields offering to lead a temperance crusade against demon rum.

Why is Henry Kissinger so determined to have the United States embrace Communist Cuba?

Part of the reason, no doubt, is the whole do-anything-to-please-the-Communists mentality which plays such an important part in detente. And there is ample evidence that the Soviets would like to see the American taxpayers underwrite the cost of the glorious socialist experiment on the island.

Although Cuba had been one of the wealthiest nations in the Americas before the advent of Communism, presently it is a $1.5 million per day liability for Moscow. Much better that the burden be shifted to U.S. taxpayers.

In fact, the Union Defensora de la Democracia, an anti-Communist group in Mexico, reported in mid-1975 that the stage has already been set for the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank to loan Cuba all the money it needs to cut its $8-million-per-week umbilical cord with Moscow. The loans, of course, will never be repaid; the money will be loaned by the Rockefellers, but guaranteed by the U.S. government.

When Castro defaults, the U.S. government will pay off the Rockefellers.

It would hardly be the first time that American taxpayers have rescued Rockefeller operations in other countries. A huge number of U.S. loans for "less developed countries" have a strange way of ending up in the pockets of the Rockefellers.

Foreign aid programs, for example, apparently insure Rockefeller gaming lodges in Kenya, Rockefeller agricultural and marketing businesses in Iran, a Rockefeller ceramic tile and bath accessory plant in Korea, Rockefeller firms in the Dominican Republic, and House of Rockefeller enterprises in India, Guyana, Brazil, Pakistan, the Philippines, and dozens, perhaps scores, of other countries.

The London Sunday Telegraph on August 31, 1957 however, provided an even more intriguing explanation for the Rockefeller-Kissinger embrace of Castro:

"This year's most surprising detente—the resumption of relations of a sort between President Ford's U.S.A. and Fidel Castro's Communist Cuba—owes a good deal more to hard heads than to soft hearts. The motive behind it can be summed up in one word—oil. . ."

Recent seismological tests by the Russians in Cuban waters have apparently revealed the likelihood of several large oil structures which form the immensely rich Gulf of Mexico oil fields. But Castro knows only too well that to develop such fields he will need American finance.

Kissinger's kiss-and-make-up approach to Communist Cuba (at U.S. taxpayer expense, of course) is bad enough for America. But actually his policies regarding Cuba seem like hard-nosed anti-Communism when compared to his incredible actions aimed at surrendering U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal.

If American sentiment and official congressional action count for anything, the chances that the federal government will give away the Panama Canal are zero. On June 24, 1975, the House of Representatives voted 246 to 164 to prohibit any State Department funds from being used to negotiate the surrender of any U.S. rights in the Panama Canal Zone.

Public surveys taken about the same time showed that five Americans out of six wanted the U.S. to retain ownership of the Canal. And a group of 38 Senators—four more than needed to block ratification of any giveaway treaty—was on record opposing any surrender of U.S. rights in the Canal Zone.

But popular sentiment and even Congressional action were not enough to thwart a Kissinger who had already chosen a different direction. Following the House vote, he sent the following message to General Omar Torrijos, the pro-Soviet dictator of Panama:

"I want you to know that in spite of these things, I am still engaged in the search for a final and just solution to this problem and the establishment of a new and more modern relationship between the two countries."

In other words, Henry the K was apologizing to Comrade Torrijos because the representatives of the American people refused to go along with Kissinger's surrender scheme!

Despite the propaganda line being developed to "legitimize" the surrender of our sovereignty over the Panama Canal, the facts are as follows:

  • The Panama Canal belongs to the United States.
  • The Canal Zone was sold to this country on November 18, 1903, by the new Republic of Panama.
  • The agreement gave the United States total and complete ownership "in perpetuity".
  • The treaty was ironclad—it stated that U.S. sovereignty would be "to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority."

Despite what some American negotiators, such as Ellsworth Bunker and William D. Rogers, have suggested, it seems absurd to think that the U.S. could be stampeded into signing away the Panama Canal because of sword-rattling by a tiny Latin American country. "If Panama does not recover the Canal Zone, no one can prevent the Panamanians from destroying, making inoperative, or paralyzing the canal", said one foreign policy adviser.

Panama "has reached the limit of its patience" in negotiations with the U.S. for a new treaty, warned Dictator Torrijos in early 1975. The United States has 11,000 troops stationed along the Canal—twice the number of soldiers that Torrijos commands. But Bunker and Rogers act as if they were truly worried about what this tinhorn dictator might do.

Ellsworth Bunker, moreover, seems to have made a career out of surrendering gracefully to the Communists. He was the main negotiator of the team that turned over control of West New Guinea to Communist Achmed Sukarno in 1965, in exchange for a worthless promise of free elections.

Bunker later was appointed U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, where he continually lectured American military officials on the need to exercise "the Patience and restraint to fight a limited war with limited means for limited objectives". Ellsworth Bunker is, in short, a giveaway artist and a capitulation expert. He is just the kind of fellow Kissinger would select for negotiations on giving away the Panama Canal.

Incredibly enough, Bunker has claimed that giving the Panama Canal to the Communists will somehow be good for us.

"In our negotiations we are attempting to lay the foundations for anew—a more modern—relationship which will enlist Panamanian cooperation and better protect our interest", he has said.

That groaning sound you hear is Teddy Roosevelt turning over in his grave. Teddy Roosevelt, who maneuvered to get the canal built, later said,

"The canal must not be internationalized. It is our canal; we built it; we fortified it, and we will not permit our enemies to use it in war. In times of peace, all nations shall use it alike, but in time of war our interest becomes dominant."

The United States does not "rent" the Canal Zone, this country paid for and has clear title to it. Giving away the clear title we have to the Panama Canal is exactly the same as giving Alaska back to Russia, returning the Louisiana Purchase to France, or surrendering Texas and California to Mexico and Spain.

It will not surprise you to learn that an early architect of the Panama giveaway scheme was a Rockefeller man, Robert B. Anderson of the CFR. He was President Johnson's chief negotiator in 1967, subsequently kept on by Richard Nixon. (The, first U.S. official to propose that the Canal be internationalized was the very respected CFR man in the State Department, Alger Hiss!)

But it was that other, much better known Rockefeller agent, Henry Kissinger, who took up the cudgels from Anderson. Herr Henry signed a "statement of principles" with Dictator Torrijos in February 1974, promising that the U.S. would renounce sovereignty over the Canal and hand it over to Panama. When Nixon resigned and Ford assumed what used to be the highest office in the land, Kissinger was quick to inform Panama that "the change in the U.S. presidency will not affect the negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty".

Perhaps alarmed by the growing opposition within the United States to Kissinger's surrender schemes in the Caribbean, a new Rockefeller pressure group, "The Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations" was launched in mid-1974 (a few months after Secretary Kissinger signed the 'statement of principles' with Panama's Marxist Dictator), to marshal public support for our planned retreat. The commission is financed by grants from—would you believe?—the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, the Clark Foundation, and David Rockefeller's Center for Inter-American Affairs.

The Commission promptly unveiled its own program for peace in Central America. The major plan, of course was a call for a new treaty with Panama in which the United States would cancel all claims to ownership of the Canal.

When this Rockefeller-Kissinger giveaway scheme encountered heavy opposition in 1975, not only from the public but also from Congress, the Rockefeller Commission came up with a new wrinkle to the basic surrender plan the Shadow Government had been following. The new scheme, which was designed to sidestep opposition from the Congress, called for the United States to continue to use the land and facilities in Panama, and pay for them, but to transfer jurisdiction to Panama.

Since the deal would not involve any sale or transfer of U.S. property, Congress would be left out of the negotiations—and the U.S. would retain an empty title. This Rockefeller-designed gambit is probably behind Kissinger's convoluted explanation of our new policy regarding Panama:

The U.S. is seeking to establish a new and mutually acceptable relationship between our two countries whereby the U.S. can continue operating and defending the canal for a reasonably extended period of time. A new treaty would enable the U.S. to devote its energies to the efficient operation and control of the waterway and would leave other matters to the Panamanians.

Translate that to read: We'll arrange it so that Uncle Sap—I mean, Sam—will continue to pay all the bills. But we'll make sure that when the chips are down, it will be our Comrades in Panama—and Moscow—who will determine which ships pass through and which ones don't.

What would the loss of American jurisdiction over the Panama Canal mean? first would be the devastating diplomatic consequences of yet another collapse of American power and authority, but there is a far more serious aspect of Henry K's two-pronged campaign to legitimize Communism in Cuba and to surrender our sovereignty over the Panama Canal.

As we reported earlier, the Soviet Navy now surpasses the U.S. Navy. It virtually controls the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, and through the Soviet conquests in Africa, is becoming dominant in the Atlantic, should part of the price for Kissinger's detente mean the loss of both the Panama Canal and the U.S. base on Guantanamo, the stage would be set for the Communists to sever the connecting link between the U.S. Pacific fleet and our Atlantic forces. In effect, Kissinger's planned retreat in the Caribbean would extend the Soviet spheres of naval dominance from the Black Sea across the Atlantic to our very shores. It would leave all of Latin and South America unprotected and indefensible.

As Representative Daniel Flood has stated:

"I do not see how the Kremlin itself could have prepared a more effective plan for causing confusion and chaos on the Isthmus than has been done by our treaty negotiators—a plan that is designed to assure the ultimate extinction of all United States authority with respect to any canal on the Isthmus."

Or to put it another way, Moscow's most important man in Latin America is not Fidel Castro; it's Henry Kissinger.